Copy/Paste from my source document is below, unformatted. There are various accounts and most call say "a tank of the KV series" but dated/named photos and other reliable accounts name it as a KV-2. I am not sure how that map will turn out but I am doing my best to recreate the immediate vicinity from source images.
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When Germany launched her attack against Russia on the morning
of 22 June 1941, Army Group North jumped off from positions along
the border separating East Prussia from Lithuania. On D plus 1
the 6th Panzer Division, which was part of Army Group North,
was ordered to occupy the Lithuanian town of Rossienie and thence
to seize the two vehicular bridges across the Dubysa River northeast
of the town (map 17). After Rossienie was taken the division
was split into Combat Teams R and S, which were to establish two
bridgeheads, Combat Team R being assigned the bridge nearest
Lydavenai, a village situated almost due north of Rossienie. By
early afternoon both columns had crossed the river and contact was
established between the two bridgeheads.
Mopping-up operations around its bridgehead netted Combat Team
R a number of prisoners, about 20 of whom, including a first lieutenant,
were loaded onto a truck for evacuation to Rossienie. One German
sergeant was placed in charge of the group.
About half-way to Rossienie the truck driver suddenly noticed a
Russian tank astride the road. As the truck slowed to a halt, the
prisoners pounced upon the driver and the sergeant, and the Russian
lieutenant lunged for the sergeant's machine pistol. In the struggle
that ensued, the powerful German sergeant freed his right arm and
struck the lieutenant such a hard blow that he and several other Rus*
sians were knocked down by the impact. Before the prisoners could
close in again, the sergeant freed his other arm and fired the machine
pistol into the midst of the group. The effect of the fire was devastating.
Only the lieutenant and a few others escaped ;the rest were
killed.
The sergeant and the driver returned to the bridgehead with the
empty truck and informed their commanding officer that the only
supply route to the bridgehead was blocked by a heavy tank of the
XV type. The Russian tank crew had meanwhile severed telephone
communication between the bridgehead and the division command
post.
The Russian plan was not clear. In estimating the situation, the
bridgehead commander felt that because of the encounter with the
tank an attack against the rear of the bridgehead was to be expected ;
accordingly, he organized his force immediately for all-around defense.
An antitank battery was moved to high ground near the
command post, one of the howitzer batteries reversed its field of fire
so as to face southwestward, and the engineer company prepared to
mine the road and the area in front of the defense position. The tank
battalion, which was deployed in a forest southeast of the bridgehead,
prepared for a counterattack.
During the rest of the day the tank did not move. The next morning,
24 June, the division tried to send 12 supply trucks from Rossienie
to the bridgehead. All12 were destroyed by the Russian tank. A
German reconnaissance patrol sent out around noon could find no
evidence that a general Russian attack was impending.
The Germans could not evacuate their wounded from the bridgehead.
Every attempt to bypass the tank failed because any vehicle
that drove off the road got stuck in the mud and fell prey to Russians
hiding in the surrounding forest.
On the same day, an antitank battery with 50-mm. guns was ordered
to work its way forward and destroy the tank. The battery confidently
accepted this mission. As the first guns approached to within 1,000
yards of the XV,it remained in place, apparently unaware of the
German movement. Within the next 30 minutes the entire battery,
well camouflaged, had worked its way to within firing range.
Still the tank did not move. It was such a perfect target that the
battery commander felt that it must have been damaged and abandoned,
but he nevertheless decided to fire. The first round, from about
600 yards, was a direct hit. A second and a third round followed.
The troops assembled on the hill near the combat team's command
post cheered like spectators at a shooting match. Still the tank did
not move.
By the time that the eighth hit was scored, the Russian tank crew
had discovered the position of the firing battery. Taking careful aim,
they silenced the entire battery with a few 76-mm. shells, which
destroyed two guns and damaged the others. Having suffered heavy
casualties, the gun crews were withdrawn to avoid further losses. Not
until after dark could the damaged guns be recovered.
Since the 50-mm. antitank guns had failed to pierce the 3-inch
armor, it was decided that only the 88-mm. flak gun with its armor piercing
shells would be effective. That same afternoon an 88-mm.
flak gun was pulled out of its position near Rossienie and cautiously
moved up in the direction of the tank, which was then facing the
bridgehead. Well camouflaged with branches and concealed by the
burned-out German trucks lining the road, the gun safely reached the
edge of the forest and stopped 900 yards from the tank.
Just as the German crew was maneuvering the gun into position, the
tank swung its turret and fired, blasting the flak gun into a ditch.
Every round scored a direct hit, and the gun crew suffered heavy
casualties. Machine gun fire from the tank made it impossible to
retrieve the gun or the bodies of the German dead. The Russians had
allowed the gun to approach undisturbed, knowing that it was no
threat while in motion and that the nearer it came the more certain
was its destruction.
Meanwhile, the bridgehead's supplies were running so low that
the troops had to eat their canned emergency rations. A staff meeting
was therefore called to discuss further ways and means of dealing
with the tank. It was decided that an engineer detachment should
attempt to blow it up in a night operation.
When the engineer company commander asked for 12 volunteers,
the men were so anxious to succeed where others had failed that
the entire company of 120 volunteered. He ordered the company to
count off and chose every tenth man. The detachment was told about
its mission, given detailed instructions, and issued explosives and
other essential equipment.
Under cover of darkness the detachment moved out, led by the
company commander. The route followed was a little-used sandy path
which led past Hill400 and into the woods that surrounded the location
of the tank. As the engineers approached the tank, they could
distinguish its contours in the pale starlight. After removing their
boots, they crawled to the edge of the road to observe the tank more
closely and to decide how to approach their task.
Suddenly there was a noise from the opposite side of the road, and
the movement of several dark figures could be discerned. The Germans
thought that the tank crew had dismounted. A moment later,
however, the sound of tapping against the side of the tank was heard
and the turret was slowly raised. The figures handed something to the
tank crew, and the sound of clinking dishes could be heard. The
Germans concluded that these were partisans bringing food to the
tank crew. The temptation to overpower them was great, and .it
probably would have been a simple matter. Such an action, however,
would have alerted the tank crew and perhaps have wrecked the
entire scheme. After about an hour the partisans withdrew, and the
tank turret was closed.
It was about 0100 before the engineers could finally get to work.
They attached one explosive charge to the track and the side of the
tank and withdrew after lighting the fuse. A violent explosion ripped
the air. The last echoes of the roar had hardly faded away when the
tank's machine guns began to sweep the area with fire. The tank
did not move. Its tracks appeared to be damaged, but no close examination
could be made in the face of the intense machine gun fire.
Doubtful of success, the engineer detachment returned to the bridgehead
and made its report. One of the twelve men was listed as
missing.
Shortly before daylight a second explosion was heard from the
vicinity of the tank, again followed by the sound of machine gun
fire; then, after some time had passed, silence reigned once more.
Later that same morning, as the personnel around the command
post of Combat Team R were resuming their normal duties, they
noticed a barefoot soldier with a pair of boots under his arm crossing
the bivouac area. When the commanding officer halted the lone
wanderer, all eyes turned to watch. The colonel was heard asking
the soldier for an explanation of his unmilitary appearance. Soon the
sound of their voices became inaudible as the two principals in this
little drama engaged in earnest conversation.
As they talked, the colonel's face brightened, and after a few minutes
he offered the soldier a cigarette, which the latter accepted, visibly
embarrassed. Finally, the colonel patted the soldier on the back,
shook his hand, and the two parted, the soldier still carrying his
boots. The curiosity of the onlookers was not satisfied until the order
of the day was published, together with the following extract from
the barefoot soldier's report:
Iwas detailed as an observer for the detachment that was sent
to blow up the Russian tank. After all preparations had been made,
the company commander and I attached a charge of about double
the normal size to the tank track, and I returned to the ditch which
was my observation post. The ditch was deep enough to offer
protection against splinters, and I waited there to observe the effect
of the explosion. The tank, however, covered the area with sporadic
machine gun fire following the explosion. After about an hour,
when everything had quieted down,I crept to the tank and examined
the place where I had attached the charge. Hardly half of the track
was destroyed, and I could find no other damage to the tank. I
returned to the assembly point only to find that the detachment had
departed. While looking for my boots I found that another demolition
charge had been left behind. I took it,returned to the tank,
climbed onto it, and fastened the charge to the gun barrel in the
hope of destroying at least that part of the tank, the charge not
being large enough to do any greater damage. I crept under the
tank and detonated the charge. The tank immediately covered the
edge of the forest with machine gun fire which did not cease until
dawn, when I was finally able to crawl out from under the tank.
When I inspected the effect of the demolition,I saw, to my regret,
that the charge I had used was too weak. The gun was only slightly
damaged. Upon returning to the assembly point,I found a pair
of boots, which I tried to put on, but they were too small. Someone
had apparently taken my boots by mistake. That is why I returned
barefoot and late to my company.
Here was the explanation of the missing man, the morning explosion,
and the second burst of machine gun fire.
Three German attempts had failed. The tank still blocked the
road and could fire at will. Plan 4, calling for an attack on the
tank by dive bombers, had to be canceled when it was learned that
no such aircraft could be made available. Whether the dive bombers
could have succeeded in scoring a direct hit on the tank is questionable,
but it is certain that anything short of that would not have
eliminated it.
Plan 5 involved a calculated risk and called for deceiving the
tank crew. It was hoped that in this way German losses would be
kept to a minimum. A feint frontal attack was to be executed by
a tank formation approaching from various points in the forest east
of the road while another 88-mm. gun was to be brought up from
Rossienie to destroy the tank. The terrain was quite suitable for this
operation; the forest was lightly wooded and presented no obstacle
to tank maneuver.
The German armor deployed and attacked the Russian tank from
three sides. The Russian crew, clearly excited, swung the gun turret
around and around in an effort to hit the German tanks which
kept up a continuous fire from the woods.
Meanwhile, the 88-mm. gun took up a position to the rear of the
tank. The very first round was a direct hit and, as the crew tried
to turn the gun to the rear, a second and a third shell struck home.
Mortally wounded, the tank remained motionless, but did not burn.
Four more 88-mm. armor-piercing shells hit their mark. Then, following
the last hit, the tank gun rose straight up as if,even now, to
defy its attackers.
The Germans closest to the tank dismounted and moved in on their
victim. To their great surprise they found that but two of the 88-mm.
shells had pierced the tank armor, the five others having made only
deep dents. Eight blue marks, made by direct hits of the 50-mm.
antitank guns, were found. The results of the engineer attack had
amounted to only a damaged track and a slight dent in the gun barrel.
No trace of the fire from the German tanks could be found.
Driven by curiosity, the Germans climbed onto the tank and tried to
open the turret, but to no avail. Suddenly, the gun barrel started
to move again and most of the Germans scattered. Quickly, two
engineers dropped hand grenades through the hole made by the hit
on the lower part of the turret. A dull explosion followed, and the
turret cover blew off. Inside were the mutilated bodies of the crew.
The Germans had come off poorly in their first encounter with a
XV at this point of the front, one single tank having succeeded in
blocking the supply route of a strong German force for 48 hours.
Small difference!
