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Operation Bagration 22/6/44 to 29/8/44

I take it, its too late to ask you two to take this to PM's to discuss it. I for one am getting tee'd off with getting 'into' a thread and enjoying the cut and thrust of the argument only to have it locked because someone has spat their dummy out. Please calm down.

After a moment of rantrain, sun is shining again. :D

But you've read Clausewitz, right? Best advantage is having ten-time numerical advantage.
 
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A 10 times numerical advantage has not helped conscript armies in recent wars.

I don't think that there has been a single case where Iraq/Serbian/Somali militias army had actual 10 time numerical advantage. Besides, Clausewitz was talking about opponents of equal technological level.

Does anyone have any good information about supply situtation of Bagration? Bagration had serious problems with supply lines as RKKA closed up with Polish border.
 
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I noitced from the Zaloga book that there were one or two battles worthy of an RO map.

One engagement that caught my eye was a battle on the 29th June where the 29th Tank corps tried to force across the river Berezina but was 'rebuffed' by a recce battalion of the 5th Panzer division. I thought rebuffing was something that happened in debates and stuff, but I am guessing that that recce battalion came up with something a bit more than a clever argument.

So maybe someone could make a map called RO-Berezina :D ;)

p.s. Buddy and RSS - if you get this thread closed with your "Itchy and Scratchy" antics I will put a ****ing hex on the both of you.
 
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I don't think that there has been a single case where Iraq/Serbian/Somali militias army had actual 10 time numerical advantage. Besides, Clausewitz was talking about opponents of equal technological level.

Does anyone have any good information about supply situtation of Bagration? Bagration had serious problems with supply lines as RKKA closed up with Polish border.

I know they started off with 1 and half million tons of supplies - it musta been a helluva job concealing where all that was being concentrated, let alone concealing the troops that were going to use it.

By this stage I think the Sovs were pretty well kitted out with lend-lease Studebakers and so on, so I think they must have genuinely started running out of stuff rather than just not being able to get it to the front in time. My guess is that they got through a lot of artillery shells and decided that, without the usual "Shock and awe"-style barrage that they had pretty much got used to using to commence assaults, it was time to give it a rest.

The Stavka probably also wanted to make sure that they were getting their soldiers indoctrinated regarding their entry into foreign soil - explaining why the Polish and German farmers seemed to be so much better off than their own Kolkhozniki - but that is pure speculation.
 
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RKKA In WW2 website has some great photos from Bagration action.

http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/galleries/trucks/ZIS_5/ZIS_5V_4.jpg


Here's a photo (post-Bagration, Dec 1944) of RKKA work horse, ZiS-5. It seems that it's built during the war (wooden cabin and a single headlight) and it's hauling borsch (barrels at the back). Another fella is from artillery branch, unless I'm badly mistaken.
 
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I don't think that there has been a single case where Iraq/Serbian/Somali militias army had actual 10 time numerical advantage. Besides, Clausewitz was talking about opponents of equal technological level.

Does anyone have any good information about supply situtation of Bagration? Bagration had serious problems with supply lines as RKKA closed up with Polish border.
I would Guarantee Somali Militia's out-numbered the US Forces at least 10-1.

And US Forces are fairing a heluva lot better than the Soviets did. In fact, The Soviets had no military successes after WW2. Even when they had numerical and technological advantage. But they sure could run over civilians with tanks well.
 
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Von Clausewitz is good for the theory behind war, more for the reasons behind it, etc. I still trust Sun Tzu more for the actual "how-to" of war.

Von Clausewitz seems to have been more of a "whys and wherefores" guy, though studying the motivations can really be helpful when it comes to achieving your end goal. Losing sight of the reasons behind what you're doing is one of the definitions of fanaticism.

I'd like to add that (as Sun Tzu pointed out, actually) numerical advantage doesn't automatically ensure victory. If the Sovs used a simple plan of attack in their operation, that would be the most helpful, IMO. I've always felt that a more general plan of attack is probably the best way to go. The plan goes out the window, anyway once the first shots are fired. A plan that's not as specific allows for more flexibility on the field. Overly-rigid planning has lost more battles than it's won, I'd wager.
 
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We did it at the Falklands and we won :)
That's true yes. But the reason for that outnumbered attack by the Brtis was that they were surprised (apparently) and needed to make hasty actions before the Argentines could fully conquer and fortify the islands. Strictly speaking, the Argentines were the attackers and the British the defenders.:)

It should be noted though also that the British forces were much better prepared and more professional compared to the Argentine ground forces who were subscripts for a large part, sent into combat with only minimal training (some of them had shot only about a hundred shots on the range before being shipped to the Falklands). Argentine had hoped there wouldn't be any combat at all. Bad guess.

I would Guarantee Somali Militia's out-numbered the US Forces at least 10-1.

And US Forces are fairing a heluva lot better than the Soviets did. In fact, The Soviets had no military successes after WW2. Even when they had numerical and technological advantage. But they sure could run over civilians with tanks well.
You are probably referring to Irene, which is an isolated incident hardly suitable to describe the whole conflict. Apart from that: The result was UN forces leaving the country and by that "losing", no?

Also the only Soviet war (apart from Korea, which theoretically noone ever won) I can remember was the Afghan one, which all-in-all is pretty comparable to the trauma the US were suffering in Vietnam. Both inflicted heavier casualties to their enemies and both were unable to realize that this does not insure a victory.
 
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That's true yes. But the reason for that outnumbered attack by the Brtis was that they were surprised (apparently) and needed to make hasty actions before the Argentines could fully conquer and fortify the islands. Strictly speaking, the Argentines were the attackers and the British the defenders.:)

It should be noted though also that the British forces were much better prepared and more professional compared to the Argentine ground forces who were subscripts for a large part, sent into combat with only minimal training (some of them had shot only about a hundred shots on the range before being shipped to the Falklands). Argentine had hoped there wouldn't be any combat at all. Bad guess.

The sea warfare was a bit more even.

Strictly speaking we were defending??

The only defence we did was from the resident Marines who did a sterling job before being simply overrun.
We we arrived it was some time after the Argentines had and they had time at least at unit level to organise a 'hasty' defence. Don't be misled by the word hasty, I'm using it here as a military term. It means that the commander at unit level was able to arrange a defense.
Bottom line they had more men abeit poorly trained as you pointed out.
Their special forces WERE well trained and gave a good account of themselves.
Their pilots were both brave and dogged and exacted a high toll from the shipbourne forces.
In combat against the RAF pilots there, they were limited by their endurance (they had no spare fuel) and it has to be said the RAF were better trained and had better planes.
Naval comparisons became meaningless after the Belgrano was sunk, at which point the Argentine surface fleet was withdrawn.
None of this takes away from the bravery,skill and tenacity of troops who were fighting thousands of miles from home against an enemy who outnumbered them and were defending. By all manner of comparisons it was an impressive victory though as Sandy Woodwood said afterwards "It was a close run thing"
 
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I meant defending as in not being the agressor. Afterall they never fought on Argentine grounds.

They were forced to act quickly and attack a numerical stronger enemy by the circumstances. I think if they had have the time they would've assembled larger ground forces before attacking. And I do think naval comparison is inevitable, as afterall a very large part of the casualties were endured by them and the British navy played a major role in their victory. It wasn't my intention to take credit away from anybody, I merely tried to explain why I think they took the unusual risk of attacking with a numerical disadvantage.
 
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I think we're talking a cross purposes here Krazy. We broadly agree, makes a change I know :D. Your points (as always) are well made. As to never invading Argentinian territory....LOL that was what the war was all about. The Argentinians considered the Falkland Islands or Malvinas as Sovereign Argentinian Territory. So if you like, they were the 'home' team. The whole conflict ironically had far reaching consequences, it resulted in the fall of one head of state (Galtieri) and the reelection of a Prime Minister (Thatcher)
 
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