Some stalingrad quotes/Discussion

[TT33]

Stalingrad is obsesed by many people, games, movies ect. posted this here to provide an area to disscuss the Battle.
Please do not flame, but feel free to add to this thread. I got some historical excerpts from perhaps the one of best Stalingrad books I have read so far: Stalingrad:The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943 by Antony Beevor:

1.The Volga crossing:

Chuikov,decided not to wait until darkenss had completely fallen. the first wave of guardsmen were rushed forward in the twilight to a mixture of gunboats from the volga foltilla and commandeered civilian craft-tugs,pinnaces,barges,fishing barques,even row boats. German artillery, mortars and any machine guns close enough to the bank switched their aim. Columns of water were thrown up in midstream, drenching the
occupants of the boats. The siliver bellies of stunned fish soon glistened on the surface.

The first wave of Rodmimtsev's guardsmen did not fix bayonets. they leaped over the sides of the boats into the shallow water of the river's edge and charges straight up the steep,sandy bank. In one place, the germans were little more than a hundred meters away.

There were NKVD detachments on many of the ships, ready to shoot anyone who dived overboard in a final attempt to avoid their fate on the west bank. German shell bursts were enough to make anyone lose their head. If anyone panicked a sergeant or officer would shoot the offender on the spot and roll his body over the side

The boats on which they had embarked bore every sign of the crossings dangers. One of the fire-fighting launches, refitted as a naval craft for the Volga flotilla, was said after one outward and return trip to
have received 436 bullet and shell holes; only a single squard yard of hull was untouched.

The easiest target for the German guns were the rafts used by the engineer regiments to ferry heavy supplies,such as timber for bunkers,across to the city. When on of the rafts drifted onto the west bank , and soldiers there ran forward to help unload , they found a "sapper" lieutenant and three of his men so riddled bymachine-gun fire that "it seemed as though iron teeth had savagely torn the sodden logs of the raft and these
human bodies."

 

[Nestor Makhno]

I do not wish to flame but if Beevor's book is the best you have read so far then you can't have read very many.

His research was ground-breaking at the time for a mainstream western book but he seemed to find it all too easy to lapse into stereotypes when he did not have the material available.

Far better are the following:

"How the Red Army Triumphed" by Mike Jones for a psychological insight into the defenders and what made them tick.

Anything by Jason Mark for a 'Wehrmacht procedural' approach. His 'Island of Fire' is one of the best books ever written about any battle imo. Depth of research that is staggering, human aspects highlighted and a good overview of the terrible attrition both sides suffered.

The passages you highlighted there are good, in that they make clear the sheer panic the Soviets were in at the thought that they were about to lose the main landing stages. So much so that they were willing to take the terrible punishment a daylight crossing entailed.

Some of the stuff he mentions, however, about the NKVD and, later in the book, the colonel who 'decimated' his division is, of course, purest fantasy - not worthy of consideration by researchers.

I have no doubt that the subject of the future game will provoke endless debates about the actions of the NKVD and the Zagradchiki:

Were they bloodthirsty political automatons who machine-gunned their own men for fun? Or did they just help old ladies' cats down from trees?

I expect that the coming months will see plenty of 'evidence' supporting either extreme. I would say that unless evidence is confined to first-hand accounts from primary sources we will not get a satisfactory view. Sadly, the more dramatic scenes from Beevor's book are the ones where he strays furthest from such directly relevant material.

A clear view of Stalingrad is not going to develop until people look a bit further than that book.

 

[TT33]

His research was ground-breaking at the time for a mainstream western book but he seemed to find it all too easy to lapse into stereotypes when he did not have the material available

Perhaps, like everything else a grain of salt must be taken when reading this or any other publication, however I find your defense of the NKVD a bit unsettling.

'Island of Fire'

Heard of it never had the pleasure of reading it, Beevor may have used it as a reference will check on this later.

do not wish to flame but if Beevor's book is the best you have read so far then you can't have read very many.

from perhaps the one of best Stalingrad books I have read so far

There is nothing wrong with Beevor's general view there's lots of very detailed little tid-bits in there that other publications miss or just do not get into (feels a bit more 3d if you get my meaning than some of the other written stuff). I like the way he sometimes quotes various very important people in his book as well as other not so important people it gives it a nice element, he has some small mention but interresting tank battle stuff in there.

Anyway Nestor Like I said feel free to add to this thread:

 

[DietOrange]

My favorite passage from all my Stalingrad books

From Enemy at the Gates by William Craig:



"While his army tried to ride out the crisis caused by the cutting of the regular supply lines, the soldiers of Batyuk's 284th Division around Mamaev Hill witnessed and extraordinary mini-war over some of those supplies. Every Russian soldier received a daily ration of one hundred grams of Vodka. Most waited for it eagerly; only a few refused it. But Senior Lt. Ivan Bezditko, "Ivan the Terrible" to his men, had an incredible taste for vodka and found a way to keep a plentiful supply on hand. When troops in his mortar battalion died, Ivan reported them "present" and accounted for," and pirated their daily vodka rations. In a short time, the thirsty officer amassed many gallons, which he carefully stored in his own dugout.

In a warehouse on the Volga shore, a supply officer, Major Malygin, checked his records and noticed that Bedditko's unit had borne up extremely well under weeks of bombardment. Suspicious, Malygin pursued the matter and discovered that the mortar section had actually suffered heavy casulties. He called Bezditko, told him he had exposed his petty scheme, and was going to report him to Front Headquarters. Then he added, " Your vodka ration is being canceled."

The supply officer had gone too far. Bezditko screamed, "If I don't get it, you'll get it."

Malygin hung up on him, relayed news of the crime to headquarters and shut off Ivan's liquor rations.

Enraged, Bezditko contacted the firing point for his .122 millimeter batteries, issued a precise set of coordinates, and gave the order to shoot. Three rounds dropped squarely on top of Malygin's warehouse at the riverbank, and out if the smoke and debris tottered the shaken major. Behind him hundreds of bottles of vodka had broken and spilled onto the floor. Malygin staggered to a phone and asked for headquarters. His anger rising, he shouted out what he knew to be true: Ivan the Terrible had gotten him.

The voice on the other end was patient but unsympathetic, "Next time give him his vodka. He just got the Order of the Red Star, so give it to him."

The incredulous Malygin stormed back to his warehouse and stood helplessly in the midst of the shattered rows of spirits. Within hours, Lieutenant Bezditko's liquor ration resumed and Malygin never again interfered with Ivan the Terrible's larceny. "

 

[Nestor Makhno]

LOL@DO's post - that is a story about Russians shooting their own side I have absolutely no trouble in accepting.

I do not remember defending the NKVD.

The idea propagated in Enemy at the Gates and, to an only slightly lesser extent, Beevor's book, that the NKVD were there to gun down any soldier that flinched from battle is just totally wrong and a moment's rational thought would demonstrate why.

Whatever you might think of the NKVD, if you think that systematically gunning down men in front of their comrades just before they go into battle is going to 'motivate' them then you are probably mistaken. If you think that any organisation would be so stupid as to believe that such executions would work, even a Soviet organisation born from times of utmost paranoia, then you are again most likely mistaken.

The NKVD definitely did receive orders to shoot deserters and they certainly did shoot men who had left the battlefield. It is a matter of official record. There was a very enlightening post on this very matter in the old RO forums IIRC. What the evidence (i.e. figures from archives) suggests they did NOT do, not because they were nice guys but because it would make no sense, was kill combat troops in the combat zones. Most deserters found some distance behind the lines were turned back, sent to punishment battalions or, in a fairly small minority of cases, shot.

The Soviets had so few men in Stalingrad that they could not afford to randomly cut down men pour encourager les autres to quote Voltaire. In fact Stalingrad did turn out to be the great leveller of the Soviet forces as there were so few defenders in the earlky days that the NKVD had to fight just the same as all the others - the orlovka salient is a very good example of this. This seems to have had a positive effect on the morale of the Soviets (if you take what Mike Jones says as accurate, and, having met the guy on many occasions and seen his source material, I do).

Presumably this increase in morale was caused by the feeling of "We're all in this together".

Where I find this demonising of the NKVD most suspect and, to someone who has a deep regard for Russia and its people, insulting is that it suggests that the average Soviet soldier fought so hard simply and purely because he was scared of a bullet in the back.

Certainly the Germans had a hard time understanding how Ivan could actually have the temerity to resist the mighty 6th Army and had a very hard time accepting the facts that:

a) their tactics which had served them so well in blitzkrieg across Europe were not going to help in Stalingrad

b) that General Chuikov had grasped that the soviet officers needed to lead by example and get themselves in the thick of the battle with their men and inspire them that way whereas von Paulus preferred to sit back from the front and treat the battle as a textbook tactical exercise, and...

c) that order 227 actually did have some effect in firing up the men, if only by emphasising that they could not run forever.

......far easier for them to believe that the 'subhuman Russians' would happily deliberately slaughter their own men to achieve military aims. (Actually thinking of Voroshilov at Leningrad that is not too far from the truth but certainly not in as direct a fashion as EATG et al suggest)

So, to summarise - the NKVD did bad things and were certainly involved in shooting of deserters, but did not gun down men if/as they broke on the battlefield.

Why? not because they were nice guys, but because they were too busy fighting alongside the regular troops and because there were not enough men to spare anyways.

When I can dig out those figures I will happily post them in this thread.

 

[TT33]

The idea propagated in Enemy at the Gates and, to an only slightly lesser extent, Beevor's book, that the NKVD were there to gun down any soldier that flinched from battle is just totally wrong and a moment's rational thought would demonstrate why

The only NKVD quote above makes reference to those whom are trying to leave the battle. I never held the enemy of the gates view of an officer standing by a Maxim 1910 and gunning down hundreds of Soviets. I do not really know how this turned into an NKVD thread it was not my intention although I guess its ok.

Most deserters found some distance behind the lines were turned back, sent to punishment battalions or, in a fairly small minority of cases, shot.

Yes, I read of this as well most were sent to punishment battalions I saw the figures somewhere (can't remeber off the top of my head) a small number (compared to the numbers of russians detained) were actually killed. Those figures would be appreciated.

Where I find this demonising of the NKVD most suspect and, to someone who has a deep regard for Russia and its people, insulting is that it suggests that the average Soviet soldier fought so hard simply and purely because he was scared of a bullet in the back.

It's not the bullet that kept them fighting the Russians were great fighters, however in terrible condistions with ill-trained recruits whom have never really seen anything outside their homes its not difficult understand why some of them were nervous as it even happened to the best of soldiers on all sides of the war especially when met with a Blitzkrieg style attack-(Shock and Awe). The NKVD shooting/detaining what it considered "defeatists" is more a window into a tyannical Bolshevik government under Stalin as well as his monumental military mistakes rather than a commentary on the common Soviet soldier in many cases when the common Soviet soldiers even some higher up in rank were cut off from Moscow they thrived.

Somewhat related: Documentry reciently they interviewed an NKVD officer he said the following: ( I believe this was in the defense of Moscow 1941, second lines)

“We forced them [Red Army troops] to fight to the death. If they resisted or ran away we eliminated them. We shot them. That’s all. They weren’t fighters anymore. It was hard. It was bad. I understand. But what can you do?”
- Vladimir Ogryzko, 1st NKVD Division

from WWII behind closed doors

 

[Nestor Makhno]

I translated something about a similar sitaution from "Za nami Moskva" where 2 or 3 soldiers fleeing from the lines during operation Typhoon were actively telling the troops marching to the front to "Run, save yourselves" and were simply shot on the spot by the Company leader of the troops heading for battle.

Not an NKVD soldier, mind, but an officer who did not want his men to panic. I am not justifying it and the soldier who recalled it (Chevgus, I think his name was) gave it as an example of how deperate the situation was with the Germans bearing down on Moscow.

By the time of Stalingrad the Soviet high command was beginning to adopt a more pragmatic approach to their previous rigid system of political supervision and it was during the battle itself, IIRC, that the system of the CO having to clear all orders with the political supervisor was scrapped.

And the troops seemed to fight the better for it.

When I get the chance I will post some of the better extracts from the books I have mentioned to give a flavour of what I am most impressed by of the events of the biggets battle ever fought.

For an insight into the battle that cannot be beaten, I repeat my thorough recommendation of Island of Fire, which was, inciodentally, published by Leaping Horseman books some years after Stalingrad, by Beevor.

 

[CrazyThumbs]

I've been meaning to get 'Island of Fire' for some time now, but it's still pretty pricey.

It's been a while since I've read anything on the Eastern Front, would you recommend David Glantz at all? I've heard the name and have seen some of his books, but I can't remember if I read any.

As for quotes, (this is from memory)
"Animals flee this hell, the strongest stones cannot stand it for long, only men endure"
-I believe it was an anonymous German Officer

 

[Nestor Makhno]

David Glantz is definitely one of the most respected authorities on the Eastern Front and I would say that you could do far worse than read "When Titans Clashed" as an intro to the theatre.

 

[[TW]Wilsonam]

It's been a while since I've read anything on the Eastern Front, would you recommend David Glantz at all? I've heard the name and have seen some of his books, but I can't remember if I read any.

Ok, that one did make me laugh... Lt Col David M Glantz (US Army, Ret) set up the US Army's Soviet Studies group at Ft Leavenworth fair while back. He has been one of the most respected authors and researchers on the Eastern Front for about 2 or 4 decades, following on from Ericson's earlier efforts. David is also well respected in Russia, for his reasonable and even-handed approach. His writing can be a little dry in the detail - but "When Titans Clashed" is indeed a bit of a classic. Stumbling Colussus & Colussus Reborn are superb works as well. But I haev to admit to being biased: David is also a friend, who helped me get my visa for the US!

 

[CrazyThumbs]

It was more a question about his writing style. John Erickson is very well respected, but I can't make it through his books because they're so dryly written.

 

[fiftyone]

This is an interesting debate.
Excuse me for saying so.

Thanks...

 

[D3terioNation]

Whew at last something to read apart from bloody KF related posts all day long!

I watched something really interesting today on discovery (I think) about how the Germans were dropping dead of starvation and when they discovered this they fed them better and even more died of feeding syndrome which was un-heard of before then!

And how the poor German uniform played a bigger role in their demise then people give credit for. Basically the Ruskie winter uniform was so much better at keeping soldiers combat ready! And the oil/petrol mix they used to prevent guns jamming..

Also how little tanks played in the overall outcome (shame) so Stalingrad was definitly all about the footsoldier!

 

[Nestor Makhno]

I don't think you (or rather the Discovery channel) can say that tanks had a small role in the encireclement of the 6th army in mid-November.

 

[D3terioNation]

Look u arrogant tw*t, in the overall out come of the entire Stalingrad operation, tanks played a small role!

Mmmmmkay?

 

[LemoN]

if tanks played a small role, then how the hell did the russians manage to encircle the 6th army?

tanks played a small role in the streetfighting, that is true, but talking abut the whole operation is just wrong

without tanks the germans wouldnt have raced to stalingrad that fast

 

[D3terioNation]

Off course tanks were present! Im just saying your typical brutal Stalingrad battles were fought by infantry with little or no support from armour!

We cant pretend that the majority of HOS maps should be CA maps can we??

 

[LemoN]

first you say entire stalingrad operation, now you say just streetfighting

and your typical stalingradbattle would be in the subburbs, because there was fighting in the open steppes and in the urban, so if you would have to mix everything togeather into one map it would be fighting with tanksupport in a suburb

 

[[TW]Wilsonam]

Before everyone claws each other's eyes out... as of 1 Dec 1942, of the 23 Divisions trapped in the encirclement, 3 were Panzer Divisions (14, 16 and 24). Plus 3 and 60 Motorised. Plus 1 Stug Abteilung (245) and 3 PzJgAbt (521, 611 and 670). Now not much of it was operational in December - but there was armor and it was used in the streets.

As of 1 Sep 1942, 62 Army included 2 full Tank Corps (2 and 23) and at least one Tank Brigade (169). More tanks in the streets.

Then add in the battles out on the Steppe - by 1 Dec, you have the full 5 Tank Army in play.

Plenty of tanks... however, also correct that a lot of the detail fighting came down to infantry going toe-to-toe. And armor in the streets is almost always a bad idea. Reading some of the reports from 24 Panzer Division would be amusing if it wasn't also sad.

 

[Nestor Makhno]

To bring together two topics - here is a quite from Island of Fire illustrating why CA did not always work too well in the urban parts of the battle of Stalingrad.

This is about the use of StuG Abt. 245 in support of the assault by German pioneers on the Admnistration building of the Barrikady Gun Factory on November 11th.

First, from Major Josef Linden, the head of the pioneers that were given the task of assaulting the building and others around it that morning:

"Assault guns were employed now and then during the pioneer attacks. Nevertheless approach routes for the missions had to be precisely reconnoitred beforehand because of the impassable terrain. The assault guns could not follow up the attacks of the pioneer assault groups and operated only from the rear as fire support. Even doing this, losses in assault guns occurred on our side because the Russians also had heavy defensive weapons in their forward line that were skillfully camouflaged..."

It was not only heavy defensive weapons that gave problems, though.

The politruk of the militia company defending the admin building (known as 'Kommissarhaus' to the Germans) recalled this:

"The Germans held a building just across the street from us. They fired cannon at us. The shells penetrated the thick walls and exploded inside the rooms. Machine guns showered us with lead rain... the enemy then threw tanks and infantry against us. The first to engage the enemy tanks were the anti-tank riflemen of Comrade Danilin's group. They used Molotov cocktails to burn out the first tank. The second tank manoeuvred to bypass us in an attempt to crush the mortar battery north of the house. The anti-tank riflemen lay amidst the rubble of the building's central stairwell. They opened fire but the tank continued to fire its gun. Soon the antitank rifle fell silent.

What had happened? Company Commander Fedotov crawled to the positions of the anti-tank riflemen. Heavily wounded, they lay unconscious as two more tanks approached the building. Fedotov himself positioned the anti-tank rifle and burned out a tank as it was turning in front of the house. The Germans quickly began getting out of the vehicle. Several enemy soldiers from a nearby basement ran out to assist them. We cut them down with sub-machine gun fire and burned out another tank. The fourth vehicle turned back. The enmy infantry which followed the tanks dispersed in numerous directions At this time, an enemy machine-gun, which was situated in a window covered up with bricks, opened up just across from us. Our anti-tank riflemen soon silenced the gun."

A couple of things to consider about this episode are that the German StuG crews - in a mixture of the experimental SiG33b and long-barrel StuG's - were fairly inexperienced, some never having been in an armoured vehicle in combat before. They showed this by turning side-on against an enemy strongpoint less than 25 metres away. When the enemy have PTRDs this is clearly not a good move, no matter what the tactical expedient is for going where you are going.

The other thing to consider is the effect of PTRDs against brickwork; in fact, the penetration of any wepaon against seemingly solid obstacle. In the Krasnyi Oktyabr factory I saw metal girders about half an inch thick which had been penetrated by what looked like MG bullets - the holes with ragged edges that made it look like the metal had torn like paper. Given that bullet penetration modelling in RO2 seems likely (I hope) this is going to make for some very cautious gameplay.

Quotes (via 'Island of Fire' Marks, 2006, Leaping Horseman Books, p108) from Monograph by Linden, p15 and from "Na 'Ostrove Lyudnikova'" in Bitva za Stalingrada, 1970, Nizhne-Volzhskoye Knizhnoye Izdatelstvo, 577-8