So better to throw away men's lives in an operation just for the sake of it? I find it hard to believe all commanders would have agreed with you there, especially during the actual period we are discussing. In fact there were plenty of commanders who objected to Market Garden.
The fact is there were other options, you make it sound as if Market Garden was inevitable, how would we be able to even possibly determine that? I mean I lost my crystal ball yesterday so....
From what I understand, your logic is that the mere existence of Airborne forces on reserve in England necessitated the operation? We simply cannot make such a broad statement, especially since war is an evolving process. I.e. if Market Garden had not happend, there would have been other circumstances arising which would have lead to different strategic decisions, there was no way that at the highest levels of command that it was held as inevitable that the Airborne forces had to be used in that sector...there was actually fervent debate on teh subject.
BTW This is typical English military folly.
The same folly that results in things like the Charge of the Light Brigade, basically boiling down to that you have men, you have the enemy, so if nothign else is going on, you might as well send them into a meat grinder head on, simply because you have something to put through the meat grinder.
We have beef....so lets make some hamburger, no sense in letting it sit. Bah.
Besides, even IF Market Garden was inevitable, the details of it were still resultign from Monty's thinking. The ambitions of the operation, and how it would be carried out, were germinated under his watch, there was no inevitability to the particulars of how the operation would go down.
This is the main thing about Monty, because as you say if we account for numerical advanatage many commanders are brought down a notch.
But there are other factors, like using tactical and strategic acumen.
Monty does not have a very illustrious history of using either. Alamein was an extremely strightforward operation, simply consisting of builidng up massive reserves, a large openign barrage, clearing mine zones, and then a tank assault.
In neither Sicily nor Normandy was there any brilliant flash of tactical success on his part, and Market Garden is then left of course as his strategic brainchild. Market Garden was fundamentally flawed.
The entire operation's success hinged upon a single armored force making their way over long range, through enemy territory, up a single, narrow road. There were no other mechanzied forces moving forward, the Germans could bottleneck the single force on this road and delay them the entire way.
If military history teaches us anything, it is that plans which are exceedingly rigid and don't allow for contigencies are almost certainly doomed to fail. Underestimating your enemy has historically always resulted in woe as well.
Market Garden was such a plan. It presupposed success based upon the very arrogant notion that XXX Corps would achieve complete surprise and speed with minimal German opposition. It contained no contingencies if XXX Corps was held up, leaving the "airborne carpet" entirely cut off. All that was needed for Market Garden to fail was for one single portion to not work as intended, and when this happened, it indeed failed.
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