Let's get this back on track.
Let's take a look at Stalingrad, specifically Wintergeiwitter. There seems to me to be two interesting "possibilities":
1. What if Paulus had ordered a breakout to meet Manstein?
2. What if Manstein had cancelled Wintergeiwitter outright and abandoned 6th Armee earlier?
Case 1: Breakout
Conventional wisdom here seems to tend to the argument that 6A was in no condition for a breakout. Fuel and ordinance for vehicles was all but depleted, the men were half-starved and frozen, there were huge numbers of wounded, etc. Any signs of a break out would have triggered a mass attack by the encircling soviet forces. 6A might very well have been anihilated on the soviet steppes and all those forces involved in the seige would have been released against Manstein and Army Group Don much sooner, probably with dire consequences.
On the other hand, had even a few divisions worth of men managed to make it out of the trap, it might have been a significant morale boost for the germans. Or maybe not.
What do you think?
Case 2: Abandon 6th Armee
There are also many who believe that Manstein never felt Wintergeiwitter had a chance in the first place. The front was shattered. 6A was actually more valuable pinning soviet seige forces in place.
What if Manstein had immediately ordered a retreat? The soviets might have been hard pressed to follow it up with the seige in their rear. Manstein might have found the time to form a line much further east than where it eventually settled after the backhand blow. This in turn may have had a huge impact on the strategic situation pre-Kursk.
Politically, is it likely Manstein would have been able to survive abandoning 6A? What would have been the impact of Manstein being forced into retirement prior to Kursk?
What do you think?
Edit: Oh, and here's an interesting 3rd idea: What if the Soviets had not split their forces between Operations Uranus and Mars? Yes, it would have allowed the germans additional mobile reserves to commit to Stalingrad, but what impact would an additional 1,000,000 men have had on the soviet side of things?
As far as 6A is concerned, I believe that if Paulas ordered a breakout immediatly after the encicrlement they had a very good chance of succes. They still had supplies and the men were not malnurished(sp) and not as many wounded as in the later months. That was the only time the 6A had any chance of breaking out succesfully, after that all hope was lost.
Operation Winter Storm was a waste of time, resources and manpower, imo. It did tie up considerable ammount of Russian units, 2 or 3 Armies I believe, and also got the Soviets worried so much so they sent their Armored reserves to stem the advance.
But by the time operation Winter Storm took place, the 6A contribution was holding now a massive ammount of Soviet troops in place. What should of happened was all the forces Manstein had available should of been used to establish a new front or stem the Soviet advance toard Rostov. Had he done so, the Soviets would of gotten as far, and wouldn't of cut off Army Group A in the Caucasus.
Of Course this is all hindsight anyway and at the time the German High Command believed they could pull it off. But in Mansteins book, he goes on to say it was a lost cause to try and rescue the 6A. Even he tried his best he knew it was a waste and the forces used could of been used better esle where.
Mansteins brilliant 'back-hand' blow as he called in the winter of 42-43 after the disaster showed the Germans were still capable of an effective, elestic defense. This manstein proved at this time. Even with limited forces and limited supplies, he managed to totally destroy 1 Soviet Army group and severly maul 2 others, who barely escaped an encicrlement. Only some of the Russian troops made it out without any of their equipment.
However, his elastic defense strategy was forbidden from then on by Hitler as he did not want to give up ground. However Mansteins strategy was the one that should of been adopted, trading space for time, and dealing the Soviets these back hand blows. Let them attack and then counter-attack, cutting off their advance.
I went a little off topic there, but in ties in with the over all strategy or events of that year and following year.
Zitadelle, Manstein proposed a defense, to let the Soviets attack first, and do what he did at the begining of the year, back-hand blow again. Let the Soviets attack, and fall back gradually, trading space for time, not to give up the land wholesale, but not to stand ground. This would slow down the Russian advance, while at the same time allowing German forces to fall back and save precious lives and resources. When the time was right, a counter-attack was to be carried out at the extended Russian flanks.
This probably would of been the best strategy for the Germans post Stalingrad. And as proven it did work, even with very limited forces. With the new reinforcments and tanks in summer 43, this strategy would of been perfect, imho.