The Problem With German Strategy (Essay Advice)

[Jono]

Okay so I'm in my second year at university studying History. The reason I decided on History has its roots in playing RO when I was a kid, so where better to come for advice on the WWII for an essay?

The essay asks to what extent was 1942 the turning point in the war. I've had a think about it and all the obvious stuff springs to mind:

1942 -> Stalingrad; halting the German advance in the East/ Operation Torch begins in N. Africa

But to my mind, 1941 represents a much better turning point;

1941 -> Pearl Harbour (U.S joining the war)/ Operation Barbarossa (doomed from the start... Essentially in 1941 the two countries that would decisively end the war and become superpowers became mobilised.

Then we have the more abstract approach which involves continuity and change. The idea more or less revolves around there being no turning point: that the inherent values of Nazi ideology doomed them from the start (war is the natural state of mankind).. their twisted war aims meant that they could not devise a fully effective military strategy.

It's 2500 words and there doesn't seem to be enough argument here. Essentially I'm asking you if I've missed anything obvious or any central areas of debate that I could dive into to lengthen the essay.

Thanks

EDIT: The title of this thread is a little off since that was a different question but you can see that this is a bit broader because it involves the war in the pacific.

[Bluehawk]

In 1942 you also have the battle of Midway where the Japanese navy was irrevocably crippled. At that point the Japanese could not project power beyond what they already held, and it became a matter of trying to hold what they could until the Chinese campaign resolved itself, which was a stalemate after the failed offensives in 1939... A month or two after Midway you also have the battle of Gaudalcanal and the Solomons campaign which prevented the Japanese from at least conducting long range air raids on Australia and New Zealand. Even after losing the core of their fleet, the Japanese were keen to relive their land-victories of Hong Kong and Manila, but the soul of the Army died in the Solomons, and their ambitions now faced questions of quantity AND quality: they could not beat American and Commonwealth forces in a fair fight, and they could not position themselves when and where they wanted to. In 1941 the banzai charge was still how objectives were captured - after 1942 it became how objectives were honourably ceded. The Allies knew they would win at that point, it was just a matter of how long it would take and how many lives they would lose.

That's almost completely unrelated to Germany though, except for the fact that the Soviets were pulling troops out of their Chinese frontier and shipping them west because they knew from a contact in the German embassy in Tokyo (Richard Sorge) that the Japanese would not attack Siberia until certain unfeasible criteria were met. I can't speculate of how much of a quantifiable impact those extra troops actually had on the eastern front though.

Is your assignment strictly related to Germany in 1942, or are you meant to look at the year itself for all nations?

[Alexander Ostmann]

What Bluehawk said. In addition, I believe the turning point in the East was not Stalingrad, but at the battle of Kursk. Stalingrad was recoverable, and they did just that, despite Hitler's stupid waste of enormous life.

Kursk was just doomed to fail from the beginning. From the spy rings in Berlin that lead to the Soviets knowing weeks in advance, to the miles of minefields and endless reserves the Soviets possessed, it's unbelievable that the Germans even went ahead with the assault.

If it had to be the year 1942, however, I'd say it was both the Battle of El Alamein and Stalingrad that were the turning points in the European/African theater.

[Jono]

Ah Midway of course, knew I had missed something.

The question is critically examine whether or not 1942 was the turning point of the war, I wrote the wrong name for the thread because that was a different question I was going to do.

Normally uni essays have more controversy and are based around a key area of debate but this one seems a little simple (as did all the other questions in fact), so really I need someone to offer a controversial point on this.

Thanks again!

[Nestor Makhno]

You could make the point that Barbarossa was a far larger gamble strategically than many seemed to believe at that time. The Wehrmacht had won some brilliant successes with sweeping movements of armour, backed by tight air support in relatively short, confined operations in Poland, the Low countries and France and the Balkans.

Regarding it overall strategy, Barbarossa was flawed from the get-go; the decision to aim for 3 goals in the first year (North, South & Moscow) was mad, but almost achieved - the failure of operation Typhoon marking the high-water mark of Nazi successes. To compound this strategic folly in 1942 by splitting the Southern goal into two further goals (Caucasus and Stalingrad) definitely put the seal on things.

Don't forget that the Soviet high command trickle-fed reinforcements into Stalingrad to just about keep it alive whilst the big armies gathered on the wings. They had the resources to start rolling things back with the relocation of the war industries to the Urals, and they had learned enough by this stage to recover from the disadvantage of having an officer class decimated by purges.

Once the 6th army was destroyed there was no real chance of recovery, strategically, just operational level success, which came in Kharkov and a few other places, but failed to come at Kursk.

[Jono]

Cheers Nestor

So would you accept the view that 1942 was the turning point in the war? That, essentially, everything was to play for until then?

[Nestor Makhno]

Interesting fact - Turkey was looking at entering the war if Stalingrad had fallen.

I guess they wanted to try and grab Baku and the oilfields - not sure if the Germans woulda stood for it, though. They probably thought of that oil as theirs.

I have a copy of the intercept of the German ambassador's message to Berlin, somewhere IIRC.

Also, yes, despite the fact that it means agreeing with the toadster*, I would say the failure to take Moscow in operation Typhoon, late 41 was the turning point. Late 41 also saw the USA enter the war so I think it's best to say that 1941 takes the prize.

*j/k toadie - you brighten my day, now that I am getting used to your ways

[sampsa]

Wasn't the tide turned against Axis in North Africa also during 1942? In El Alamein?

[Jono]

For the sake of being controversial:

Isn't it just mere economic determinism to say that 1941 was the turning point? In hindsight, we may recognise that the full mobilisation of the United States was the single most important event in the war. But by no means did it guarantee certain success for the Allies. In the East, Stalingrad was yet to be fought - the Caucasus oil fields still a glimmer of hope - and the Battle of the Atlantic was hardly in full swing. The U-boats still had the potential to severe the Atlantic supply-lines. They weren't neutralised effectively until 1943.

In the Pacific, Midway hadn't been fought yet. As Richard Overy stated, "The outcome of battles are not preordained, else nobody would bother to fight them. [...] The Battle of Midway was only won because 10 out of hundreds of bombs dropped hit their targets".

[Nestor Makhno]

I could not find the exact message I was referring to in my mass of intercepts.. mostly cos they are from Luftwaffe groups in S. Russia.

Luftwaffe used ridiculously overpowered transmitters, confident that their signals could not be decrypted. So basically they transmitted directly to Bletchley Park, all the way from Russia.

The embassy stuff was an afterthought in the daily reports to Churchill but interesting nonetheless.

http://www.tonygillham.com/embassy_intercepts

Bear in mind when looking at these that embassies are always huge rumour mills but, even so, some interesting insights here.

[Seth_Soldier]

for western front

1942 wasn't the turning point
1943 was.

In 1942, the german army was still able to create offensive.
In 1943, the loss of the afrika korps, loss of the 6th army, kursk, italian allies and loss support of satellites(romania, hungary, ... trying to pull out), loose the battle for the atlantic, battle for the air domination force germany to be on the defensive.

In 1943 allies know they are going to win but don't know when. They begin to plan the postwar

[Clowndoe]

Originally Posted by Seth_Soldier

for western front

1942 wasn't the turning point
1943 was.

In 1942, the german army was still able to create offensive.
In 1943, the loss of the afrika korps, loss of the 6th army, kursk, italian allies and loss support of satellites(romania, hungary, ... trying to pull out), loose the battle for the atlantic, battle for the air domination force germany to be on the defensive.

In 1943 allies know they are going to win but don't know when. They begin to plan the postwar

On that basis I wouldn't call 1943 at turning point, it merely represents sort of critical mass where the Axis had suffered too many set backs to get back in the game. 1942 would still be the turning point because that's when the Allies started winning battles with some regularity. I still don't like talking about turning points because you can always think up a scenario whereas a side could still have won. I'm sorry my last sentence is downer since you have to write on this.

[Gudenrath]

1941 was the turning point of the war. It was the year Germany declared war on the Soviet Union and USA. Before that the Axis had had the advantage in the war, but from then on the scales tipped and the allies had the superiority in all aspects, from manpower to economy.

[salti]

I might be pointing out the obvious , but the essay question is why was 1942 a turning point.
Not what do you think the turning point of wwii was , although there may be valid reason's why anyone may think that.......thats not the question.
It would be a wrong move to start arguing such a point in an essay asking what factors affect the war in 1942.

[Krobar]

Russian Winter. Best national defense system in history. That is all.

[Alexander Ostmann]

Originally Posted by Krobar

Russian Winter. Best national defense system in history. That is all.

Agreed, as the Soviets themselves had no hope of stopping the Germans otherwise.

[BlackLabel]

Do we only talk military strategy here ? Dont forget that the germans made the huge mistake NOT to use all the captured russians or those that surrendered and pretty much turned the population against them whom first greeted them as liberators. ( tho about 1.2 million? men served as "hiwis" )

[Nikita]

Originally Posted by Alexander Ostmann

Agreed, as the Soviets themselves had no hope of stopping the Germans otherwise.

The ability of the Red Army is too often disparaged in terms of its fighting ability, especially during the first years of the war. They were far from being steamrollered. Many of the Soviet counterstrokes, while failures and at times poorly executed, were well-timed, especially on the road to Leningrad. Some extremely large encircled Soviet units fought on longer than expected, consumed German lives and resources that were expended to vanquish them, further hamstringing the offensive.

In addition, the RKKA fielded 35-40 new armies from the outset of Barbarossa in 1941 through December (821 division equivalents). Armies. Generalship, not numbers, would have determined how effective this force was, but there was certainly the potential to halt the Wehrmacht and their Axis allies in 1941 with this force. In comparison, the Wehrmacht had already lost a fifth of its troops by this point, and was far less capable of replacing them.

Arguably, the actual winter of 1941 had little actual effect on the Germans--what had prevented Typhoon from proceeding on schedule was the rainy season and the mud--which actually occured uncharacteristically late that year in October. Moreover, with the arrival of fresh Russian troops, which Hitler was fully aware of, he would have had to order the troops to a halt and to dig in regardless of winter's onset, and likely regardless of the delay caused by mud. The Germans were well below optimal strength and running short on fuel, making a handover of initiative more or less inevitable.

The idea that weather primarily defeated the German Army in Russia is a view that has long passed its retirement age.

[Bluehawk]

I'd like Jono to come back and tell us how it went.

[Alexander Ostmann]

Originally Posted by Nikita

The ability of the Red Army is too often disparaged in terms of its fighting ability, especially during the first years of the war. They were far from being steamrollered. Many of the Soviet counterstrokes, while failures and at times poorly executed, were well-timed, especially on the road to Leningrad. Some extremely large encircled Soviet units fought on longer than expected, consumed German lives and resources that were expended to vanquish them, further hamstringing the offensive.

In addition, the RKKA fielded 35-40 new armies from the outset of Barbarossa in 1941 through December (821 division equivalents). Armies. Generalship, not numbers, would have determined how effective this force was, but there was certainly the potential to halt the Wehrmacht and their Axis allies in 1941 with this force. In comparison, the Wehrmacht had already lost a fifth of its troops by this point, and was far less capable of replacing them.

Arguably, the actual winter of 1941 had little actual effect on the Germans--what had prevented Typhoon from proceeding on schedule was the rainy season and the mud--which actually occured uncharacteristically late that year in October. Moreover, with the arrival of fresh Russian troops, which Hitler was fully aware of, he would have had to order the troops to a halt and to dig in regardless of winter's onset, and likely regardless of the delay caused by mud. The Germans were well below optimal strength and running short on fuel, making a handover of initiative more or less inevitable.

The idea that weather primarily defeated the German Army in Russia is a view that has long passed its retirement age.

Well of course the winter didn't defeat the Germans. Anyone that believes that is a buffoon. I said it was their best defense, not the end all, be all.