Please, you have to mention that the so-called "hugging tactic" was mainly used in Stalingrad.
Chuikov's order no. 166:
Soviet improvements in supply were countered by overwhelming German superiority in the air and in armor. Chuikov's account of the battle makes it clear that the Luftwaffe dominated his calculations about what he could and could not do—his troops simply did not move about during the day. German air power also drove his tactical doctrine of ordering his troops to close with the Germans as much as possible, reducing the danger of air attack thanks to the German fear of accidentally targeted their own troops. By mid-September 1942, with both flanks of Chuikov's 62nd army resting on the Volga, he and his commanders noticed that German pilots “bombed our forward positions only where there was a broad expanse of no-man's-land between our forward positions and those of the enemy. It occurred to us, therefore, that we should reduce the no-man's-land as much as possible—to the throw of a grenade.”
Germans still tried "large unit operations" and "kesselschlachts", where Infantry moved in to mop up.